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Abstract
Limited attention has been devoted on how (real-life) social networks
are elicited and mapped, even less from the viewpoint of mechanism design.
This paper surveys the few mechanisms that have been proposed by the
experimental literature to this purpose. These mechanisms differ in their
incentive structure, as well as in the means of reward they employ. We
compare these elicitation devices on the basis of the estimated differences in
the characteristics of the induced networks, such as the number of (mutual)
links, correspondence and accuracy. Our main conclusion is that the elicited
network architecture is itself dependent on the nature (and the structure)
of the incentives. This, in turn, should provide the social scientist with
guidelines on the most appropriate device to use, depending on the research
objectives.
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Introduction
There is a growing literature that highlights the importance of the structure
of social networks in our social and economic life. These works explore how
social networks influence people’s behavior in a wide variety of economic
settings, from job search to information transmission within firms.1 Consequently, being able to properly map the structure of a network becomes
crucial in understanding how network architecture influences individual behavior and, vice versa, what is the impact of individuals’ decisions on the
social network’s structure and performance.
The aim of this paper is to survey the experimental literature that employs various mechanisms to elicit real (rather than fictititous, or artificially
created in the lab) social networks. These mechanisms vary from simple surveys (in which subjects are just requested to name their friends in various
manners, without incentives) to (slightly) more sophisticated devices in which
network elicitation takes place under simple incentive schemes, designed to
induce subjects to truthfully reveal the network of their social relationships.
These mechanisms employ heterogeneous means of reward (from monetary
incentives, to exam grades) and rely on different (strategic) coordination
devices.
The basic messages of this paper are that
i) friendship is a rather subjective domain, in that individuals may perceive their social ties asymmetrically, as well as of a different intensity.
This, in turn, makes the exercise of network elicitation subject to significant measurement errors;
ii) when economic incentives are employed -not surprisingly- the elicited
network architecture is itself dependent on the nature (and the structure) of the incentives. This, in turn, provides the social scientist with
guidelines on the most appropriate device to use, depending on the
research objectives.
1

See the excellent surveys of Vega-Redondo [19], Goyal [12] and Jackson [13].
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The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 1 briefly
describes the various devices employed for real-life social network elicitation, while in Section 2 we look at their differences from the viewpoint of
mechanism design, by comparing the incentive structures of the induced
game-forms. Section 3 reports our empirical findings on the features of the
induced networks, confirming our main conjecture: network architecture is
indeed dependent on characteristics of the elicitation device. Finally, Section
4 concludes, followed by an Appendix containing additional information on
the experimental design and the graphs of some representative networks.

1

Network elicitation mechanisms

This section describes the most popular devices for network elicitation, ordered (increasingly) by their complexity. Starting from non incentivized surveys, we move toward simple strategic schemes in which network elicitation
is rewarded by different means and relies on different coordination patterns.

Hypothetical surveys (HYPS)
Most of the concepts we know about social networks comes from Sociology
and strongly relies on non-incentivized elicitation mechanisms, which simply
consist in asking subjects to list their friends (see, among others, Barabasi
and Albert [1]).
The combination of survey and behavioral data has been extremely useful
to study, for instance, the interplay between social connections and behavioral traits among teenagers: consumption of marijuana, educational aspiration levels, political orientation, crime. etc... . These studies have been
useful in understanding people’s tendency to connect with those who display
similar behavioral traits, namely, homophyly (see Jackson and Rogers [14]);
and the strong preference for cliques: individuals prefer to link with those
who are already linked to each other (see Goeree et al. [11]).

Benefit-Your-Friend (BYF, Brañas-Garza et al [3])
In essence, BYF is a survey with social incentives, in the sense that subjects
do not receive any direct reward by naming a friend, but give some chance to
the latter to get something out of the fact of being named. This protocol for
3

network elicitation is extremely simple: subjects are asked to write down the
name of their friends from the same undergraduate class on a piece of paper,
since, as stated in the instructions, “there is a chance that one of them will
be later benefited in the experiment”. No further information is provided at
this stage on the type of decisions subjects would make afterwards, or what
these future benefits for the elicited friends would be.
In other words, BYF aims at revealing the identity of “close” friends.
The instructions clearly state that subjects might be given the chance to
benefit “only one of their friends”, randomly selected from their elicited list.
Therefore, the higher the number of friends they list, the lower the chance of
benefiting any one of them.

Coordination Game I (COORD-I, Leider et al. [16])
The first attempt of an incentivized mechanism for network elicitation is that
of Leider et al. [16]. Its challenging results motivated this literature, whose
aim is to use economic incentives to induce subjects to reveal “truthfully”
the complex network underlying their social relations.
In their paper, Leider et al. [16] develop an elicitation protocol based on
a simple coordination game, we call it COORD-I, with the following rules:
1. Participation is voluntary, with recruitment conducted via the Internet.
2. COORD-I is a coordination game by which each subject has to pick up
the name of her friends from a list of students of two university dorms,
together with an estimate of the time spent together with each of them.
3. The outcome function is as follows: all links are checked, yielding a
lottery by which subjects are rewarded with a prize of 50 USD cents
with a 50% chance if the link is reciprocated, and nothing otherwise. If
the difference in the reported time spent together (per week) is lower
than one hour, the winning probability is raised to 75%.

Coordination Game II (COORD-II, Cobo-Reyes and
Jiménez [7])
Cobo-Reyes and Jiménez [7] employ a mechanism, COORD-II, that can be
thought as an intermediate device between BYF and COORD-I. Like in BYF,
4

only one link is checked at random for payment; like in COORD-I, a link is
rewarded only if it is reciprocated with sufficiently close “precision ”.
The game-form of COORD-II is as follows. Students are asked to reveal
the full names of their friends in their undergraduate class, jointly with a
subjective evaluation (“strength”) of each relationship. Let sij define the
strength reported by i to the ij relationship, framed in the experimental
instructions as follows: sij = 1: j is a person i “hardly knows”; sij = 2: j
is “an acquaintance”; sij = 3: j is “a friend”; sij = 4: j is “a close friend”.
Finally, if subject i does not name subject j, let sij = 0. As for the outcome
function, subjects receive a prize if one of the following two cases holds:
Case 1 they do not name anybody, or
Case 2 they name at least one subject. In this case, one of the elicited links
is checked at random (each link being selected with equal probability).
Let ̂ denote the subject associated with the randomly selected link.
Subject i receives the prize if both rules are satisfied:
R1: also ̂ has also named i as a friend (i.e. only if ŝi 6= 0);
R2: friendship strength should also be sufficiently accurate, since, to
ensure payment, the difference in the reported strengths should
not be higher than 1: Dî = |sî − ŝi | ≤ 1.
Case 1 corresponds to an ”exit-option” we shall discuss more in depth in
Section 2, while Case 2 recalls the coordination device employed in COORDI.
To sum up, COORD-II modifies COORD-I along the following dimensions.
a) First, subjects play the elicitation protocol simultaneously, that is, they
have basically no possibility to coordinate their actions (something that
can easily done in COORD-I, where elicitation takes place via Internet,
with absolutely no control on the experimenter’s behalf).
b) Recruitment in COORD-II is not voluntary, as network elicitation
takes place during regular teaching sessions (or even during final exams
(treatment TP, see details below). This allows (almost) full participation of the social group under scrutiny, as voluntary recruitment may
5

imply self-selection issues affecting the network mapping through channels outside the experimenter’s control.2
c) In addition to the standard written consent, to further preserve our
subjects’ rights of privacy that may be infringed by the non-voluntary
recruitment protocol (a fortiori, when elicitation takes place during a
regular exam), an “exit option” is introduced (CASE 1) built in the
same system of incentives.
Through this exit option, subjects could ensure the maximum material
payoff by simply abstaining from naming any friend. As will shall see in
Section 3, introducing such a drastic rule seems to have a marginal impact in subjects’ willingness to reveal the identity of their close friends,
except in the treatments with no rewards. This is surely one of the most
interesting findings of this paper. We shall interpret this evidence in
Section 2 by appealing to subjects’ social preferences.
d) COORD-II allows to assess the effect of changes in the means of reward,
as it comes with three alternative treatments, depending on the nature
of the prize. The baseline treatment, TP, involves the use of 1 extracredit point (out of 10) in the final exam grading; in treatment TM the
prize corresponds to 5 e; while in treatment TN there is no prize at all.
In Section 3 we shall report on three networks collected under treatment
TP -TP1 to TP3 - with 53 (289 links), 51 (165 links) and 31 (152 links)
subjects, respectively; three networks TM -TM1 to TM3- with 39 (102
links), 65 (138 links) and 71 (160 links) subjects, respectively, and a
unique TN network, with 40 subjects (103 links).

2

Theoretical conjectures

Coordination and symmetry
We have already noticed that both COORD-I and COORD-II -as opposed
to HYPS and BYF- reward reciprocal elicitation. Even more, using two
different devices (one more “objective”, as time spent together, one more
2

Voluntary participation was still ensured by the fact that all subjects were asked to
give their written consent (and, therefore, they could still refuse to participate in the
experiment).
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“subjective”, as an individual assessment of the “strength” of the relationship), both mechanisms provide incentives to elicit symmetric relationships
(i.e., relationships that are perceived as similar by both parties involved).
This is natural for any elicitation device based on coordination, where we
expect subjects to disregard links that may be lived of a different intensity
by either party. Whether asymmetric relationships play a role in the topics object of study by the cited papers is open to discussion. Nevertheless,
we expect asymmetric relationships to be underestimated by any elicitation
device that relies on coordination.

All links vs. 1
As we already discussed, one important difference between COORD-I and
both BYF and COORD-II is that, in the former, all elicited links are payoff
relevant, instead of just one, picked at random. This, in turn, implies that, in
COORD-I, expected monetary payoffs are increasing in the number of elicited
links. In other words, COORD-I is meant to map a social network “as dense
as possible”. Given this design feature, we expect subjects to name as many
friends as possible, not just very close ones. By contrast, both BYF and
COORD-II limit to one the number of checked links, forcing subjects to
disregard their “marginal” social relationships (i.e., “acquaintances”).

Social preferences I: unconditional altruism.
As we mentioned in Section 1, in BYF subjects do not receive a reward by
naming a friend. Instead, they grant the latter with the possibility of a future
reward. Therefore, the extent to which BYF may outperform HYPS lies in
the degree of unconditional altruism (see, e.g., Cox et al. [8]) subjects hold
with respect to their friends, that may be exploited by the eliciting device.

Social preferences II: guilt aversion
As we described in Section 1, by Case 1, COORD-II allows for the possibility
of ensuring the full prize by simply not naming anybody. This rule of the
game-form was, in some sense, dictated by ethical issues, since very personal
information was collected during the standard activities of an undergraduate class (even more in the case of TP, which was administered during the
final exam). This consideration notwithstanding, one may argue that this
7

“exit option” may induce subjects to severely underreport their friendship
network. In game-theoretic terms, under “selfish preferences” (i.e., assuming
that subjects are only concerned in maximizing the probability of winning
the prize), Case 1 yields a weakly dominant strategy of the induced game,
since it guarantees maximal monetary payoff, independently of the others’
behavior. On the other hand, we can conjecture that the impact of CASE
1 could be significantly reduced if subjects hold social preferences (i.e., if
they are also concerned about the monetary payoffs of their friends). The
argument is straightforward: if subjects hold sufficiently strong beliefs that
they would be named by their friends, not reciprocating them will turn them
down. To the extent to which subjects exhibit social preferences (in the
special form of guilt aversion, see Charness and Dufwenberg [6]) this breaks
weak dominance of Case 1 (although a strategy profile in which everybody
conforms to Case 1 still remains a strict Nash equilibrium of the induced
game, not necessarily the most efficient one).3

“In media stat virtus”
Given Rule 2 of COORD-II, sij = 4 (1) is weakly dominated by sij = 3 (2),
∀j. The reason is that if i decides to name subject j with sij = 3, R3 will be
satisfied whenever subject j names subject i with sji > 1 (instead sji > 2,
as it happens with sij = 4). By the same token, sij = 1 is weakly dominated
bysij = 2.
In other words, subjects have no incentive to label people as “close
friends“, or people they “hardly know”, as less extreme statements adapt
more efficiently to the degree of flexibility granted by R2. As we shall see,
this -relatively straightforward- strategic clause has different impact depending on the means of reward.

Different means of reward
As we discussed, COORD-II is played under three increasing levels of incentives: no reward (TN), monetary reward (TM, 5 e) and class points (TP).4
3

It can be shown that the above argument is not restricted to guilt aversion, but is
applicable to a wider class of social preferences functionals, such those, for example, of
Fehr and Schmidt [9], Bolton and Ockenfels [2] or Sobel [18].
4
A rough calculation shows that an extra point may be much more valuable than 5 e.
In Spain, students pay tuition fees per credit. The fee for a 6-credit subject (1 credit =

8

We conjecture (and find) that increasing the value of the prize amplifies the
effects of the strategic properties of COORD-II.5

3

Results

This section report the main estimated differences in the network characteristics. We first look at links per capita (out-degree) in Section 3, moving
then to links’ correspondence and strength (Section 3).

Links per capita
Figure 1 compares the number of links per capita in Kovarik et al. [15] using
BYF in a network of 291 students with Brañas-Garza et al.’s [4] network,
elicited by way of HYPS in a network of 208 individuals.

Figure 1: Average distribution of out–degree by subjects: BYF vs HYPS.

As Figure 1 shows, BYF yields a network with a lower number of links
per capita. Interestingly, this does not translate into differences in terms of
10 hour), such as Micro II at the University of Granada, is approx. 60 e.. Given past
exam history, we can estimate at approximately 15% the ex-ante probability of a student
obtaining a grade between 4 and 5, that is, a grade for which 1 additional point would be
crucial for passing the exam; and another 5% the ex-ante probability of receiving a grade
of 8 to 9, that is, a grade for which 1 additional point more would imply Distinction, which
in the Spanish university system implies 6 free credits in the following academic year. As
rough as this calculation may be, this adds up to a 20% probability of the extra-point
being worth 60 euros, with an expected benefit of 0.2 × 60 =12 euros.
5
We provide in the Appendix a sample of network maps for each treatment, together
with some classical measures extracted from these graphs.
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corresponded links, where relative frequencies sum up to 42.5% and 39% for
HYPS and BYF, respectively.6
Figure 2 reports COORD-II’s sensitivity to variations in the mean of
rewards: points (TP), money (TM) or nothing (TN), with respect to the
estimated out-degree.

Figure 2: Average distribution of out–degree by subjects and incentive schemes.
In the x-axis 10+ refers to subjects who sent 10 or more links.

Notice that, in TP, the distribution of links is more uniform than in TM.
Also, the maximum number of links is higher in TP than in TM.
Another interesting finding is that about 10% of the participants do not
name anybody in both TM and TN. This is the same percentage we found
for BYF and HYPS (see Figure 1). Surprisingly, we find that nobody in TP
opt for the “safe” option of naming no friends, thus ensuring the prize.
We also see that TN and TM are not that different in terms of friends
per capita (z = 0.399; prob = 0.6897 two-tailed test) whether TP is distinct,
6

Brañas-Garza et al [5] uses the same device but the sample is quite small (n=53.
These subjects listed 2.79 friends on average and the correspondence level was 50.1.
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as it provides a larger number of links [TP vs. TM z = 6.502 (prob =
0.000, one-tailed) and TP vs. TN z = 6.930 (prob = 0.000, one-tailed test)].
We conjecture that this is a direct consequence of the incentives scheme:
guilt aversion is larger in the case of points, the most valuable prize across
treatments.
A simple summary of average results (pooling data from different treatments) indicates that COORD-II does not induce naming, compared with
the other elicitation devices. Less than 10% of subjects name 6 or more
friends while in COORD-I average and modal out-degree are 10. Although
TP is the incentive scheme in COORD-II that provides more links, still it
stays far away from the figures of COORD-I.
Result 1: COORD-II elicits very few links per capita compared to COORD-I.
As Figure 2 shows, nobody in TP (and a very small percentage in TM,
7%) decides to play the weakly dominant strategy of Case 1. In addition,
174 participants in TP and TM who name at least one link are reciprocated
at least once. This confirms our “social preference” conjecture put forward
in Section 2.

Correspondence and strength
We shall now look at the efficacy of the various devices in obtaining mutual
links as a proxy of their performance. Since the probability of two subjects
naming each other with sufficiently close strength at random is basically null,
if the rate of mutual links captured by our mechanism is high, we may think
that most of the links correspond to “true” relationships.
We are also interested in looking at the extent to which the differences
in the design of COORD-II, compared with COORD-I and BYF, translate
into differences in the estimated link correspondence. Recall that the main
differences between COORD-II and COORD-I is that the former provides an
exit option (CASE A) and, in general, lower incentives to name many friends
(given the fact that only one link is paid off). Therefore, we expect COORDII to capture “strong” relations, with average elicited links lower than in
COORD-I. Regarding the comparison between COORD-II and BYF, in the
latter subjects do not lose payoff if the link they send is not reciprocated, so
we also expect a lower average out-degree -and higher frequency of mutual
links- in COORD-II.
11

Table 1 looks at the efficacy of COORD-II in obtaining mutual links in
the seven networks under consideration.
D=0
D=1
D>1
Total
Not Mut
links
subjects

TP1
180
34
6
220
(76%)
69
289
53

TP2
82
31
2
115
(70%)
50
165
51

TP3
µTP
TM1
98
120
37
16
27
33
0
3
0
114
150
70
(75%) (74%) (69%)
38
52
32
152
202
102
31
39

TM2
85
16
2
103
(74%)
35
138
65

TM3 µTM µTN
74
65
3
40
24
2
6
2
0
120
97
5
(75%) (73%) (5%)
40
36
98
160
133
103
70
40

Table 1: COORD-II: link correspondence across treatments.
The first three columns of Table 1 correspond to data from TP (TP1 to
TP3), while column µTP reports treatment averages. Columns 5 to 8 correspond to the TM sessions (plus treatment average), while the last column
summarizes TN statistics. Corresponded links in each network are partitioned into three categories according with the difference in strength (D =
0, D = 1 and D > 1).
As Table 1 shows, almost 74% and 72% of the links are reciprocated in
TP and TM, respectively, while only 5% of the links are corresponded in
TN.7 Recall that COORD-I shows 37% of mutual links, while this frequency
is a bit larger in case of BYF: 50% in Brañas-Garza et al. [3] and 42.5% in
Kovarik et al. [15].8 All in all, we can say that COORD-II with incentives
(TP and TM) provides higher correspondence than COORD-I and BYF. So,
we can conclude that COORD-II is more likely to identify mutual links.
Result 2: Incentivized COORD-II elicit reciprocated relations “of close friends”.
Brañas-Garza et al. [4] find an average degree of correspondence of 39.5%
in four (HYPS) networks containing 208 students who sent 1158 links (5.56
7

We do not find differences among treaments: TP vs TM z = 0.160 (prob = 0.873,
two-tailed test) while strong differences emerge among TP vs TN z = 9.956 (prob = 0.000,
two-tailed test) and TM vs TN z = 9.834 (prob = 0.000, two-tailed test).
8
Goeere et al. [11] found a coordination of around 50% within a subject pool of children
using a survey.
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per capita).9 This percentage is much larger than the 5% of correspondence
found in TN.
Figure 3 reports the relative frequency of each strength sij across TP, TM
and TN.10

Figure 3: Average % of links corresponding to acquaintances or friends: TP, TM
& TN.

As Figure 3 shows, the relative frequency of links associated with “acquaintances” (sij = 1 and sij = 2) in TP is very small (4% and 11%, respectively). Moreover, the frequencies of links associated to “friendships”
(sij = 3) and “close friendships” (sij = 4) are very similar (45% and 40%,
respectively).11 Recall that sij = 4 is weakly dominated by setting sij = 3.
Regarding TM, Figure 3 shows that the links associated to “acquaintance” relations are also low (identical percentages than in TP, that is, 4%
and 11%, respectively). Instead, frequencies of links sij = 3 and sij = 4
9

Data shown in figure 1, page 9, labeled as HYPS correspond to Brañas-Garza et al.

[3] .
10

The displayed frequency of TP and TM is an average of the three sessions conducted
for each treatment.
11
In fact we do not find any significant difference between number of links with strength
3 and 4 in TP z = 0.601 (prob = 0.548, two-tailed test) but strong differences in TM
z = 2.473 (prob = 0.013, two-tailed test).
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are different (50% and 35%, respectively) and this difference is statistically
significant (see footnote 11), showing that weak dominance of sij = 3 (see
Section 2 seems more compelling in TM, while in TP social norms seem to
prevail to strategic consideration (exactly as for the case of the exit option).
Result 3: COORD-II mostly captures reciprocated relations of “close friends”
(especially in TP).

4

Which mechanism should we use?

This paper reports on four different devices to elicit social networks. Table
2 summarizes the main features of each of them.

BYF
HYPS
COORD-I
COORD-II TM
COORD-II TP
COORD-II TN

Incentives
yes
not
yes
yes
yes
not

L
Strength
220
0/1
1753
0/1
5690
0/1
133
0 to 4
202
0 to 4
103
0 to 4

Mutual N
45%
79
39%
398
37%
569
74%
58
74%
45
5%
40

Table 2: A comparison among elicitation devices
The main conclusions from Table 2 are that
1. COORD-I can be useful to obtain a graph with a high number of asymmetric links. On the other hand,
2. COORD-II seems to work better to obtain a high percentage of mutual
links, that is, a non directed network. Moreover,
3. BYF is not very good in term of links per capita and it is modest in
term of mutual links. Finally,
4. HYPS it is fairly good in terms of links per capita but moderate in
terms of mutual links.

14

In sum, depending on the researchers’ objectives, one mechanism turns
out to be better than others, with no “clear winner” on all dimensions.
COORD-I is better when a large network with a high number of nodes is
needed and the fact that the induced network is directed (i.e., with a relatively small number of corresponded links) is not important (for example for
analyzing individual behavior in non-strategic environments). By contrast,
COORD-II seems more appropriate when analyzing strategic environments
and games played in pairs, since, if we want to analyze how pairs of friends
play a specific game, we need bidirectional links. Finally, BYF and HYPS
seem to work worse than COORD-I and II COORD-II in terms of the number
of links although they are easier to implement.
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[5] Brañas-Garza P., Durán, M.A, and Espinosa M. P. “Favoring friends”,
Bulletin of Economic Research, 64(2): 172178, 2012.
[6] Charness G. and Dufwenberg M., “Promises and Partnership”, Econometrica, 74, 1579-1601, 2006.
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Appendix 1: more on the experimental designs
COORD-II: treatments and subjects
As we just mentioned, we conducted three treatments which differed only in
terms of the nature of rewards: extra-credit points (TP), a monetary reward
(TM) and no incentives (TN).
In the three TP sessions (TP1, 2 and 3), subjects could gain an additional
point (out of 10) for a final “bonus question” on the exam. To check the
robustness of our results to the change in rewards, we also run 4 additional
sessions. Sessions TM1, 2 and 3 use a monetary prize (5 e), while the last
–treatment TN - uses no reward at all. Instructions for all the treatments
were identical, except for the description of the outcome (reward) function.
A copy of the instructions is available in the Appendix.
All the sessions were non-computerized classroom experiments conducted
with subjects with no (or minimal) prior exposure to game theory. The
three TP sessions were conducted in June 2004 during the Microeconomics
II exam; a first-year undergraduate course in economics at the University of
Jaen, Spain. We included a “special question” as an additional item on the
final exam. We ran the experiment with three different classes: TP1 and
TP2 with students in the Business Degree program and TP3 3 with students
in the Law and Business Degree program. These three groups consisted of
51, 53 and 31 students, respectively.
The TM1 session was conducted in February 2006 at the University of
Granada. The group was comprised of 39 students from Microeconomics I;
a first-year course in economics. Identical first-year students are used for
TM2 (February 2009) and TM3 (February 2012) with 65 and 70 students
respectively.
Finally, the TN session was also conducted at the University of Granada
in February 2006. The sample was composed of 40 students from Microeconomics I; a first-year course in the Business Administration program.
The format of the classroom experiment was chosen to ensure the maximum participation of the social networks under scrutiny. If subjects named
friends or acquaintances who were not present at the sessions, the corresponding links were removed from the network since correspondence could
not be checked.12 This problem is due to simultaneous play in our experi12

As for the TP sessions, in Net 1 (2) [3] we removed 10 (8) [12] links out of a total
number of 175 (160) [289], that is, a percentage of 5.7% (5%) [4%], respectively. The rate
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mental design. This feature has the advantage that subjects could not agree
to name each other during the experiment. The main disadvantage is that
we could only consider subjects who were present as network nodes.

COORD-II: design details13
Hello, you are now going to take part in an economic experiment. We thank
you in advance for your collaboration. This is part of a project coordinated
by a teacher from the University of Alicante who has requested your collaboration to carry it out. The aim of this experiment is to study how individuals
make decisions in certain environments. The instructions are simple.
If you follow them carefully, you will receive an additional POINT TOWARDS YOUR FINAL GRADE IN MICROECONOMICS II [AMOUNT
OF MONEY] confidentially at the end of the experiment.
You may ask questions at any time. To do so, just raise your hand, but do
not speak. Except for these questions, any kind of communication between
you is forbidden and will be cause for expulsion from the experiment.
Please write a list with the name and surname of all your friends in the
class. Next to their names, you have to write a number:
1 if you hardly know him/her; 2 if he/she is an acquaintance; 3 if he/she
is your friend; 4 if he/she is a very close friend.
How do I GET THE POINT [RECEIVE THE MONEY]? We will take
your list and randomly choose the name of one (only one) of your friends
(the ones you have mentioned). We will then look at your friend’s list and
see whether:
i) he/she has mentioned you and
ii) he/she has given you a similar score to the score you have given him/her
(by ”similar” we mean a maximum difference of one point between the two
scores).
If i) and ii) are affirmative, you will win THE POINT [5 e]. If i) or ii)
fails, then you will win nothing (0 POINT [0 e]).
Let me give you an example. My list is:
of link removal for the TM and TN sessions, Net 4 and Net 5, were much higher (both
around 19%). This is because they were conducted during a regular lesson. Given that
they were not run during an exam, maximum group attendance could not be guaranteed.
13
The differences between TP and TM (TM in brackets) are highlighted in CAPITAL
letters.
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• Jose Pérez with a 3.
• Juan Martı́nez with a 4.
• Emilio López with a 1.
• Jose Antonio Rodrı́guez with a 2.
José Pérez is then randomly chosen from my list. The experimenter then
looks at José Pérez’ list and sees that he has given me a score of 4. Given
that the difference in scores was just one point, I win THE POINT FOR
MICROECONOMICS II [5 e]. If I had given José Pérez a score of 2 points,
I would win nothing.
NOTICE 1. If you mention no-one, you also receive THE POINT FOR
MICROECONOMICS II [5 e].
NOTICE 2. (about the above notice ). Be aware that if you mention
no-one, but someone mentions you, this may be prejudicial to him or her.
In other words, a friend who mentions you would not receive THE POINT
FOR MICROECONOMICS II [5e] because you didn’t include him/her on
your list of friends 14 .
14

For the TNI treatment, instructions were as follows:
Hello, you are now going to take part in an economic experiment. We thank you in
advance for your collaboration. This is part of a project coordinated by a teacher from
the University of Alicante who has requested your collaboration to carry it out. The aim
of this experiment is to study how individuals make decisions in certain environments.
The instructions are simple.
You can ask questions at any time. To do so, just raise your hand, but do not speak.
Except for these questions, any kind of communication between you is forbidden and will
be cause for expulsion from the experiment.
Please write a list with the name and surname of all your friends in the class. Next to
their names, you have to write a number:
1 if you hardly know him/her; 2 if he/she is an acquaintance; 3 if he/she is your friend;
4 if he/she is a very close friend.
Thank you very much.
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Appendix 2: Map of networks across different
means of rewards
Figures 4 to 6 show the structure of some example of networks obtained using
the different devices. Particularly we display the networks for TP2, TM1 and
TN.

Figure 4: TP2 network (51 subjects and 165 links)
The elicited networks, displayed in Figure 4 and 5, share most features
of typical social network architecture (see Newman [17]). More precisely,
there is a giant component encompassing 42 (61%) and 43 (82%) of network
20

vertices for TP2 and TM3, respectively; the second largest component only
contains 7 and 5 nodes and there are 0 (0%) and 9 (13%) unconnected nodes,
for TP2 and TM3, respectively.

Figure 5: TM3 network (71 subjects and 160 links)
The average (undirected) degree is 4.36 neighbors (Std. Dev. 1.87) and
3.46 (Std. Dev. 2.44), respectively. The clustering coefficient, i.e., the average fraction of links of a node that are linked themselves, is 0.45 and 0.53,
respectively. Notice that, in a randomly generated network of the same size
and connectivity, the expected clustering would be roughly 4.36/165=0.026
and 3.46/160=0.022, one order of magnitude lower that the observed level.
We also observe small distances (the average and maximum distance, diameter, in the giant component are 3.73 and 11, 4.32 and 11, for TP2 and TM3,
respectively).
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Figure 6: TN network (40 subjects and 103 links)
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